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MICHAEL THEUNE 
Some Thoughts on "A Mind Thinking" 
A new catchphrase has entered the discourse of and about twenti 
eth-century poetry unthinkingly. Although the catchphrase, which 
defines the task of the poem as that of portraying "not a thought, a 
mind thinking," has achieved great popularity?it has been 
employed by Elizabeth Bishop, Charles Bernstein, and James 
Longenbach?it is highly problematic. Even a glance at its formula 
tion reveals its inherent difficulties, its ambiguities and its dated 
ness. While the poem of "a mind thinking" is presented as a radical 
alternative to the poem as a static product of thought, it presents a 
picture of the mind's activity that is not at all radical. "A mind think 
ing" seems natural, eloquent, fitting; its parts?"mind" and "think 
ing"?correspond with a Cartesian clarity which, even after its 
encounter with the all-powerful evil demon of doubt, could confi 
dently claim that its mental phenomena were the results of think 
ing rather than of dreaming or delusions. In a century following 
Rimbaud's anti-Cartesian declaration, "I am another," and in a cen 
tury suspicious of the mind's mechanisms following its psychoana 
lytic boom and the work of postmodern critics from Barthes to 
Irigaray who describe the self as a construct, that such a formula 
tion could become so popular seems incredible. Thought must be 
given to the ways in which this catchphrase has metamorphosed 
from its origins as a merely descriptive tool and as a passionate 
though uncritical expression of poetic ambition and praise to its 
most recent and most troubling manifestation as a critical device for 
system-building. Thought must be given to the meanings and the 
uses and the meanings of the uses of this increasingly problematic 
catchphrase. 
The phrase, "not a thought, but a mind thinking," was first used by 
the critic Morris W. Croll in his essay, "The Baroque Style in Prose" 
(in Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm: Essays by Morris W. Croll, Princeton 
University Press, 1966), merely as part of a description; Croll says of 
his essay that "its purpose is to describe the form of.. .baroque prose" 
(208). Although non-evaluative, Croll's exciting descriptions of 
baroque prose?"It preferred the forms that express the energy and 
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labour of minds seeking the truth, not without dust and heat, to the 
forms that express a contented sense of the enjoyment and posses 
sion of it" (208)?could be compelling and helpful for anyone trying 
to express her own desire to be expressive in ways which challenge 
the norm, and, indeed, Elizabeth Bishop employs Croll's concept and 
formulation of the baroque to argue for her own poetic ideas and 
idiosyncrasies. 
Although in his essay Croll discusses specifically the baroque 
style of certain Renaissance writers, Bishop does not confine her use 
of Croll's thought to any historical period, employing it instead in 
many contexts and for many purposes. In "Gerard Manley Hopkins: 
Notes on Timing in His Poetry," a student essay written for the 
Vassar Review, Bishop quotes numerous extended passages from 
Croll's essay in an attempt to describe and celebrate how Hopkins 
"times" the delivery of his ideas, how Hopkins catches and pre 
serves "the movement of an idea?the point being to crystallize it 
early enough so that it still has movement" (Vassar Review 23, 
February 1934: 5-7). Although Bishop employs Croll's thought in 
her essay on Hopkins, it is used rather specifically to discuss 
Hopkins's "sprung rhythm." Additionally, Croll's "a mind think 
ing," though important, is just one of many metaphors Bishop uses 
to discuss Hopkins's adjustable, largely accentual lines. Bishop also 
states that Hopkins's lines are "[r]eminiscent of the caprice of a 
perfectly trained acrobat: falling through the air to snatch his part 
ner's ankles he can yet, within the fall, afford an extra turn and 
flourish, in safety, without spoiling the form of his flight." Bishop 
also compares the "difficult devices" of Hopkins's poetry to "sud 
den storms," and notes that "[a] single stanza can be as full of, 
aflame with, motion as one of Van Gogh's cedar trees." 
Expanding on her use of Croll's thought in her essay on Hopkins, 
Bishop also employs Croll's thought to describe and defend her own 
work, her own rhythms and words. In an aesthetic debate which 
took place in a correspondence (recorded in part in One Art: Letters, 
New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1994, and recounted in Verse, 4 :1, 
November 1987) begun at the suggestion of Yvor Winters, Bishop, 
in her senior year at Vassar College, took a stand against any 
smoothing over of her work, arguing with Donald E. Stanford, a 
Harvard graduate student, that the rough rhythms and odd word 
choice in the poems she had shared with him were intentional. 
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Regarding the rough rhythms, she states, "If I try to write smooth 
ly I find myself perverting the meaning for the sake of smoothness." 
Of the odd words she states, "They are the perceptions which give 
rise to the whole thing, so I don't see how they could be very well 
left out or smoothed over" (n). Searching for a way to express her 
aesthetic stance, Bishop turns to Croll, quoting extensively from his 
essay, concluding, "But the best part, which perfectly describes the 
sort of poetic convention I should like to make for myself... is this: 
'Their purpose (the writers of Baroque prose) was to portray, not a 
thought, but a mind thinking... They knew that an idea separated 
from the act of experiencing it is not the idea that was experienced. 
The ardor of its conception in the mind is a necessary part of its 
truth'" (12). 
Bishop's use of Croll's thought, already various during her under 
graduate years, changed in later years so as to concentrate on tech 
niques important to Bishop's later work. As Brett C. Miller (in 
Elizabeth Bishop: Life and the Memory of It, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993) notes, 
More than thirty years later, she recalled [Croll's essay] in an 
interview, calling Hopkins a great innovator in "poetic psycholo 
gy." Remembering the baroque sermon's attempt to "dramatize 
the mind in action rather than in repose," she saw a clear example 
of this tendency also in stanza 28 of Hopkins's "The Wreck of the 
Deutschland": 
But how shall I... make me room there: 
Reach me a... Fancy, come faster? 
Strike you the sight of it? look at it loom there, 
Thing that she... There then!... 
Bishop's later apparent digression and self-revision in her poems, 
much remarked on, are her version of Hopkins's method, the 
baroque preacher's psychological methods, which she admired. 
(54) 
A few conclusions necessary for the further investigation of Croll's 
thought may be made regarding Bishop's use of the phrase "a mind 
thinking." First, Bishop's use of the phrase is mutable; it helps, as 
one way among others, to express difficult ideas about Hopkins's 
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oddly intricate rhythms, it helps defend her own work by appealing 
to an authority, and it explains one of the origins of "Bishop's later 
apparent digression and self-revision," including, most famously, 
"One Art"?"(Write it!)." Additionally, though Croll's thought may 
be very important to, and perhaps very present in, Bishop's poetics, 
it also does not encapsulate all of Bishop. Although Thomas J. 
Travisano (in Elizabeth Bishop: Her Artistic Development, Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1988) sees Croll's thought in many of 
Bishop's undertakings, he also notes that while, in "The Fish," 
Bishop gets a "psychological dimension, the drama of the mind 
thinking... [from] Hopkins and his baroque forebearers," "the 
moral necessity behind scrupulous observation she found in Moore. 
The dramatically delayed recognition of symbolic value she found in 
Poe_It took Bishop to fuse them in a style that resembles her 
sources almost not at all" (71). In all, though "a mind thinking" may 
be an expedient phrase, indicating with some flair the signs of dra 
matic process one generally expects?whether it be in a Romantic 
descriptive-meditative poem, a Victorian dramatic monologue, or 
any of the modern or postmodern derivatives of these models?of 
romantic writing, it is not a phrase sufficient enough to name other 
aspects necessary for a full consideration of poets and poems, for it 
specifies neither what nor how its mind thinks. 
Decades after Bishop's various encounters with Croll's work, 
Charles Bernstein, in his essay, "Writing and Method" (in Content's 
Dream: Essays 1975-1984, Los Angeles: Sun & Moon, 1986), employs 
Croll's thought to critique what and how some of the "minds" of 
twentieth-century poems were?or were not?thinking, attempt 
ing to establish an alternative to "contemporary plain styles" (223) 
and to "[t]he contemporary expository mode" (224), styles of writ 
ing that too often are thought of as the only natural, legitimate ways 
to write. Bernstein claims that Croll's elucidation of the baroque 
style in prose describes "a development in some ways paralleling 
such current critiques as this one [that is, Bernstein's own] of con 
temporary expository forms, in its rejection of a static predeter 
mined formality and its attempt 'to portray not a thought, but a 
mind thinking'" (222). Remarking that "[t]wentieth-century writ 
ing has had as one of its most philosophically interesting projects 
the mapping of consciousness," Bernstein praises the styles of writ 
ing that undertook "the mapping"?"stream-of-consciousness, psy 
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chic automatism, surrealism, memory, free-association, impression 
ism, expressionism" (230), styles, it should be noted, that Bishop 
never had in mind when using Croll's thought?for the alternatives 
they provide. Bernstein states, "A value of this writing for episte 
mological inquiry was the alternative model of mind it provided... 
since the organization of words and phrases [in writing that maps 
consciousness], is based on the perceiving and experiencing and 
remembering subject rather than on the more expositorily develop 
mental lines of the 
'objective' and impersonal styles that picture the 
mind (and self) as a neutral observer of a given world" (230). 
Additionally, Bernstein notes that this new style of writing creates 
a new type of reading, "a reading that could be extended much 
beyond the specific writing practices itself," the major result of 
which is that "all writing becomes open interpretation as the trace 
of a self" (230). 
While Bernstein argues the case for the significance for poetry of 
"a mind thinking" at a time when, he believes, the expository mode 
has an almost totalizing force, he does not fully promote the type of 
poetry that maps consciousness. According to Bernstein, while the 
poetry of "a mind thinking" "does in fact break the spell of writing 
seen as a transparent medium to the world beyond it. . .it does so 
only by making a projection of self central to its methodology" 
(231). Consequently, the reader is not permitted to actively engage 
with the text. This result is, according to Bernstein, available only 
from a different kind of text: 
The text is again seen as a map, but in the sense of a model, or 
outline, or legend and not trace. Rather than work which is the 
product of the "author's" projection/memory/associative process, 
it is work for the reader's (viewer's) projection/construction. The 
text calls upon the reader to be actively involved in the process of 
continuing its meaning, the reader becoming a neutral observer 
neither to a described exteriority nor to an enacted interiority. The 
text formally involves the process of response/interpretation and 
in so doing makes the reader aware of herself or himself as pro 
ducer as well as consumer of the meaning. (232) 
In a later verse-essay, "Artifice of Absorption" (in A Poetics, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), Bernstein calls this 
type of writing "anti-absorbant" and meditates extensively on its 
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possibilities, contrasting it to absorbing "mass entertainment, from 
bestsellers to tv to 'common voice' poetry" (55), comparing and 
contrasting it with Bertolt Brecht's alienation effect and struggling 
against critics such as Helen Vendler, whom Bernstein believes 
practice critical absorption and promote work that encourages aes 
thetic absorption. Referring to Vendler's introduction to The Harvard 
Book of Contemporary American Poetry, Bernstein writes, 
But perhaps 
the most irritating thing about 
Vendler's manner of argument is that it is always 
referring to what "all" poems do, making it 
impossible for her to even consider that some poems 
may come into being just because they don't do what 
some other poems have done. Vendler says 
she hopes readers will be provoked by some of the 
anthologized poems to say?"'Heavens, I recognize 
the place, I know it!' It is the effect every poet 
hopes for." I would hope 
readers might be provoked to say of some poems, 
"Hell, I don't recognize the place or the time or 
the T in this sentence. I don't know it." (42) 
Regardless of the difficulties in Bernstein's views?many of which 
are raised in "Write the Power: Orthography and Community," a 
chapter in Bob Perelman's The Marginalization of Poetry (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 1996)?it is clear that Bernstein wants from 
poems something very specific: not a poem that re-presents "a mind 
thinking," but a poem that forces or seduces or asks?one does 
wonder exactly which?the reader to think, to witness her inter 
pretive processes. Bernstein wants poems that resist the type of 
recognition Vendler wants and which she expresses with a line from 
Elizabeth Bishop's "Poem." Bernstein, it seems, wants poems very 
different from Bishop's. 
The claim that Bernstein and Bishop do not share theoretical and 
aesthetic agendas seems so obvious?a glance at their work will 
do?that the evidence provided above seems almost unnecessary. 
The need to firmly establish the difference between Bishop's and 
Bernstein's use of the phrase "a mind thinking" is necessary, how 
ever, because that phrase is used in a recent project that attempts to 
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link the works of many major American poets, including Bishop and 
Bernstein. In Modern Poetry After Modernism (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997), James Longenbach attempts to break down 
the 
"breakthrough narrative" of American poetry, a narrative that 
tells of American poets rejecting the constraints of modernism? 
"easily characterized as traditional, impersonal, and hierarchical" 
(6)?and assuming a radically "post-" modern project. Longenbach 
instead provides a more nuanced reading, showing that the "break 
through narrative" is an illusionary critical construct, and arguing 
that postmodern poets should be understood instead as expanding 
and extending elements of modernism. Longenbach's goal, howev 
er, is not only to put an end to the use of the "breakthrough narra 
tive" but also to heal divisions in American poetry; he writes, "As 
we look toward the future, a critical narrative that forces us to 
choose between Lowell and Bishop (or between Eliot and Crane) 
will only provide ammunition for the next inevitable backlash. So 
while it's true that, like most readers, I prefer certain poets to oth 
ers, my goal is to offer an account of American poetry after mod 
ernism . . . that allows us to choose from among a variety of poetic 
practices, not between them" (2). In his effort, though, to reconnect 
American poetry by correcting a critical construct, Longenbach cre 
ates a construct of his own; Longenbach creates a real value?value 
that can be transferred from one instant of use to another?for the 
phrase that conceives of a poem as a portrayal of "not a thought, but 
a mind thinking." 
Although Longenbach argues against the notion that one form or 
meaning or project for poetry is better than another, he seems espe 
cially intrigued by and even privileges the poetry of "a mind think 
ing." The reason for Longenbach's interest in the idea of a poetry of 
"a mind thinking" is clear: such an idea allows him to connect the 
projects of seemingly different poets, for example, Bishop and 
Jarrell. He also draws together the poetry of Robert Pinsky, Jorie 
Graham, and, especially problematically, Charles Bernstein. Of the 
poems in Pinsky's History of My Heart and The Want Bone, 
Longenbach states, "These poems retain the discursive clarity of the 
long poem, but their narratives seem, even within their smaller 
compass, more comprehensive and complex, more a dramatization 
of a mind thinking than the product of thought (to borrow the dis 
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tinction Elizabeth Bishop favored)" (149). About Graham, 
Longenbach states, 
Graham herself has admitted that Bishop's music does not set her 
off as Steven's or Berryman's does, and it's easy to imagine that 
Bishop would have found Graham's poetry far more unwieldy than 
Merrill's. But Graham has also emphasized that she feels a deep 
"temperamental affinity" with Bishop, an affinity that transcends 
stylistic decorum, and it's arguable that Graham, more than any 
other poet writing today, has realized Bishop's ideal notion of 
poetic movement: "not a thought, but a mind thinking." (175) 
Immediately after this claim regarding the link between Graham's 
and Bishop's poetry, Longenbach mentions?and, it must be noted, 
misrepresents?Charles Bernstein as well, stating, "And while it's 
even easier to imagine that Bishop would have been bemused by the 
elaborate ambitions of the Language poets, Charles Bernstein has 
borrowed the same passages from Croll to underwrite his avant 
garde project. As Bernstein describes it, his critique of 'contempo 
rary forms' involves the attempt 'to portray not a thought, but a 
mind thinking'" (175). 
That the point of this use of "a mind thinking" is the creation of 
a bond for postmodern American poetry after the fall of the "break 
through narrative" is obvious; after linking Bishop, Graham, and 
Bernstein, Longenbach's penultimate paragraph discusses the sig 
nificance of the "coincidence" of the use of the Croll quote by so 
many various poets: "The coincidence . . . suggests that style never 
tells the whole story of American poetry: poets who seem, because 
of their formal choices, to have little to do with one another may 
share the deepest goals or ambivalence" (175). However, consider 
ing closely the numerous and various uses of Croll's thought, it is 
doubtful that there is inherent or deep meaning in the use of Croll's 
catchphrase. Considering that Bishop uses the phrase in different 
ways at different points in her poetic career and that Bernstein uses 
the phrase to begin a movement away from contemporary plain 
styles and then critiques his own understanding of the phrase to 
move away from it, it does not so much seem that "a mind think 
ing" is a stable signifier of anything "deep" but instead is a rather 
empty?or too full?signifier that is very easily appropriated for 
various purposes. Although he marshals other evidence to support 
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the fact that it seems as though many postmodern American poets 
to some extent value process, Longenbach uses the specific phrase, 
"a mind thinking," in large part to create a coincidence?neither 
Jarrell, Pinsky, nor Graham actually employed Croll's phrase?to 
show that postmodern American poetry has something besides a 
faulty "breakthrough narrative" holding it together. 
Longenbach also creates coincidence by simply excluding any evi 
dence which might show that there are some different opinions 
about what constitutes "a mind thinking." Very often the poets 
Longenbach wants to link discuss thinking and/or thoughts in their 
work but these discussions are never mentioned. For example, in 
"Ode to Bill" (in Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, New York: Penguin, 
1972), John Ashbery, a poet discussed in Longenbach's book, writes, 
What is writing? 
Well, in my case, it's getting down on paper 
Not thoughts, exactly, but ideas, maybe: 
Ideas about thoughts. Thoughts is too grand a word. 
Ideas is better, though not precisely what I mean. 
Someday I'll explain. Not today though. (50) 
Is this, as the poem itself seems to claim, a poem of something akin 
to thoughts, "ideas," and not a poem of "a mind thinking"? Or, with 
its digressive, delaying strategies, does "Ode to Bill" portray "a 
mind thinking"? Even if a definitive answer to that question were 
possible, it must be noted that Ashbery's poem contrasts greatly 
with Graham's poem, "Thinking" (in The Errancy, New York: Ecco, 
1997), which begins, 
I can't really remember now. The soundless foamed. 
A crow hung like a cough to a wire above me. There was a chill. 
I was a version of a crow, untitled as such, tightly feathered 
in the chafing air. Rain was expected. All around him air 
dilated, as if my steady glance on him, hindering at the glance 
core where 
it held him tightest, swelled and sucked, 
while round that core, first a transition, granular?then remem 
brance of things being 
seen?remembrance as it thins-out into matter, almost listless? 
then, 
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sorrow?if sorrow could be sterile?and the rest fraying off in all 
the directions, 
variegated amnesias?lawns, black panes, screens the daylight 
thralls into in search of well-edged things_If I squint, he glints. 
(40) 
Graham's poem presents and employs its occasionally errant think 
ing in an investigation, recording a phenomenological engagement 
between its inspecting speaker and its shifting, constructed subject; 
in its searching and groping, in its attempts to handle the many con 
tours of perception, Graham's poem tries to do what Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty prescribes in The Visible and the Invisible (Trans, by 
Alphonso Lingus, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968): 
"We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out 
in the tangible" (134). Not only does this seem vastly different from 
the delay and play of Ashbery's poem, but it also seems vastly dif 
ferent from Bishop's and Hopkins's own presentations of the 
world's emblematic avatars. Graham's phenomenological 
"Thinking" does not work at all like the thinking in Bishop's 
"Sandpiper," which metaphorically equates the poem's subject with 
the poet but excludes any explicit involvement by the poet. Nor 
does it work like Hopkins's thinking, founded upon the belief that 
all things have a unique essence, an "inscape" guaranteed by God's 
authority, which allows him in "The Windhover" not to grope but 
to grasp, to begin confidently, "I caught this morning morning's 
minion." 
While in some very abstract way, the work of Ashbery, Graham, 
Bishop, and Hopkins?perhaps even Bernstein's verse-essays? 
might all be works that "portray, not a thought, but a mind think 
ing," the concept of "mind" and "thinking" in each seems very dif 
ferent from the others. Looked at closely, "a mind thinking" 
becomes not so much that which joins all these poets as much as 
that which separates them. The fact that Longenbach fails to men 
tion any of the details of the specific thought and/or thinking of the 
poets he covers allows one to ask: if the details of "a mind thinking" 
are not significant enough to be considered seriously, why should 
the phrase itself be enough to do the massive work of linking up 
some very different poets? 
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For Longenbach's argument, the answer is simple: it is precisely 
the vagueness of the concept behind the catchphrase "a mind think 
ing" that allows Language poetry to be dealt with in a necessarily 
shorthand manner. While it seems strange that a book about mod 
ern American poetry after modernism largely excludes one of the 
major movements of postmodern American writing?the sentence 
on Bernstein is one of the book's two sentences on Language poet 
ry?such an exclusion does not seem so odd when one considers 
the threat Language poetry makes to Longenbach's effort to unite 
American poetry. By simply suggesting that the practitioners of 
Language poetry?referenced by the mention of Bernstein, their 
m?tonymie stand-in?are congenial to the notion of the poem as 
the portrayal of "a mind thinking," Longenbach can make it seem as 
though Language poets would agree with his system; however, it 
seems as though Language poets are those who would most object 
to Longenbach's attempt to unite American poetry, for Language 
poetry is not constructed on a break with modernism as much as it 
is constructed on a break from other contemporary American poet 
ry. As previously noted, Bernstein, for example, wants a contempo 
rary poetry that moves beyond the plain style and goes so far as to 
compare "'common voice' poetry" unfavorably with "bestsellers" 
and "tv." Additionally, one must conclude that Bernstein, who dis 
likes Vendler's attempts to define "what 'all' poems do," would be 
equally displeased by Longenbach's effort to say that the seeming 
diversity of American poetry is actually illusory, that in fact all post 
modern American poetry is similar because its seemingly various 
manifestations actually share "the deepest goals." 
While it seems strange that a book which successfully debunks a 
problematic critical construct?the "breakthrough narrative"? 
does much to establish one of its own, this situation becomes, if not 
less contradictory, more understandable if one considers not so 
much the meaning as the use of these critical constructs. The 
"breakthrough narrative" is useful because it provides a way to 
value and to think about the value of the poetry written after mod 
ernism. For example, Bishop's work might be seen as valuable for 
the ways it breaks from Eliot's, its value coming largely from its 
agon?illusory or not?with its predecessor. Without the "break 
through narrative" to give value to postmodern American poetry, 
Longenbach has to establish another value for American poetry 
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after modernism, and the value he proposes is that postmodern 
poems do the unique job of portraying "a mind thinking." 
Longenbach's use of "a mind thinking," then is not only a critical 
description but also a promotion, a positive evaluation, of the 
poems he describes as portraying "a mind thinking." In fact, 
Longenbach occasionally lets into his text positive evaluations 
linked to the notion of "a mind thinking" as, for example, when he 
states that Pinsky's poems, when they approach the status of "a 
mind thinking," are "even in this smaller compass, more compre 
hensive and complex." Thus, Longenbach's use of "a mind think 
ing" is similar on one level to other poet-critics' use of the idea of 
the poem as a portrayal of thinking to positively evaluate poetic 
work. For example, in "The Shield of a Greeting: The Function of 
Irony in John Ashbery's Poetry" (in Beyond Amazement: New Essays on 
John Ashbery, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), David Lehman, 
a proponent and second-wave member of the New York School, 
describes and promotes Ashbery's work, stating, ". . .Ashbery's 
poetry points to a new mimesis, with consciousness itself as the 
model; we are offered 'epistemological snapshots'. . . of a mind in 
motion..." (118). Additionally, on the back cover of C.K. Williams's 
Selected Poems, Edward Hirsch, a poet-critic of great generosity, 
promotes Williams's work by claiming, "No other contemporary 
poet. . .has given us a more textured or pressurized rendering of 
what it feels like to think?to try to think?through a situation or 
a mental problem moment by moment." That claiming a poet's 
work resembles the portrayal of "a mind thinking" has become the 
stuff of positive evaluations should not be surprising; in an age of 
skepticism regarding the totalizing systems of thought so popular 
mere decades ago?Freudianism, Marxism, etc.?the highest 
praise that critics can offer is not to link the poet's work with a def 
inite, and definitely problematic, system of thought but instead to 
claim that in the work the mind is engaged in the action of moving 
through networks of systems in a process?an often difficult, frag 
mented, elliptical process?graciously called thinking. 
While the late-Romantic methods of much twentieth-century 
American writing necessitate that the criticism written on it involve 
attention to how it makes use of the signs of process, the phrase 
becoming popular to refer to a poem that employs those methods is 
highly problematic. This is true especially in its most recent and 
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most extensive use where "a mind thinking" is employed to suggest 
a common link binding American poetry because this phrase suc 
ceeds in its task only insofar as the various thinking minds' specif 
ic thoughts and thought processes are avoided and only to the 
extent that the phrase's eloquent flash diverts attention away from 
its lack of substance. Thus, what is otherwise an astutely critical 
book, James Longenbach's Modern Poetry After Modernism, seems at 
times to be a somewhat carelessly?or craftily?constructed argu 
ment. Perhaps?even though stylish high praise is often called for 
in this post-rational age?in light of its ability to lead good, critical 
thought away from careful judgment, the seductive catch phrase 
that conceives of the poem as "not a thought, but a mind thinking" 
ought not to be used. 
In the opening paragraph of "The Baroque Style in Prose," the 
essay that started all of this, Morris W. Croll notes and rejects the 
careless use of certain words, claiming that the way those words 
had been used made their meanings "perplexing and unphilo 
sophical" and concluding, "Their use should not be extended" 
(207). Perhaps the same should now be said of Croll's own "a 
mind thinking." 
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